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Introduction

“What Sweden is today, dead and living Swedes have made it, and no one
else. Today, Sweden is ours through Swedish endeavours. The task of the living
Swedes is to preserve it and improve it by continuing this endeavour - on the basis
of freedom.”1

The above quote is from Swedish journalist Vilhelm Moberg’s essay “Swedish
endeavour.” It was published in 1941 as propaganda for the Swedish military in the face of the
threat of a Nazi occupation. Moberg is widely considered one of the most important Swedish
journalists of the twentieth century. His works often critiqued the Swedish monarchy and he was
very vocal in his opposition to the lack of Swedish resistance toward Nazi Germany. While
Sweden has come a long way since World War II, Moberg’s words about preserving Swedish
values have particular relevance today.
Sweden is often considered the ideal social democracy. The country combines a high
standard of living with a generous social safety net. Its citizens enjoy access to a wide range of
benefits including free education and universal healthcare. But in recent years, many Swedes
have become increasingly disillusioned with their welfare system. In the most recent Swedish
general election, a surprising number of Swedish citizens voted for the Sweden Democrats, a
far-right anti-immigration political party with roots in the neo-Nazi movement. While the
Sweden Democrats received less votes than expected, it still represented the largest gain by any
political party in the Riksdag (Swedish parliament). Meanwhile, the ruling Social Democratic

1

Vilhelm Moberg, Svensk strävan (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1941).

Party had their worst outcome in over 100 years. This change in voter behavior has been the
subject of much study and prompted many onlookers to declare this the end of the Swedish
model of social democracy. How are we to understand this turn of events?
Sweden is a very successful country. Over the past century, it has managed to combine
features of capitalism with social benefits such as healthcare and education. The Social
Democratic Party rose to power in the 1930s and soon became one of the most successful social
democratic parties in the world. Their success was contingent upon their ability to combine both
nationalist and socialist policies, thereby laying the foundation for the social democratic welfare
state. They did this under the assumption that it was a joint effort by the national family. They
called this new model of social democracy folkhemmet, or, “the people's home.” Unlike other
countries where the emphasis was on race and ethnicity, Sweden emphasized equality, freedom,
and democracy. Even today, polls conducted suggest that Swedish national identity is to an
unusual extent connected more to citizenship and the rule of law than ethnicity.2
However, in recent decades, the Swedish model has become the center of a political and
ideological conflict. The Sweden Democrats, the most right-wing of Sweden's major political
parties, have laid claim to the Swedish model and created a dispute surrounding its meaning.
Beginning in the 1970s, the Swedish welfare model began receiving criticism from the right, who
wanted more tax cuts. In the ensuing years, right-wing political parties began appearing in the
Nordic countries and, although they were initially opposed to high levels of taxation, their focus
shifted toward immigration and they began developing nativist tendencies. Following the most
recent wave of immigration to Sweden during the 2015 refugee crisis, the issue of immigration
2

Bruce Stokes, “How Countries Around the World View National Identity,” Pew Research Center's Global
Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center, May 30, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-be-one-of-us/.
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has been front and center in Swedish politics. This has led to a reevaluation of the Swedish
model, in particular who it is meant to benefit and who it is not meant to benefit. Unfortunately,
the Swedish model suffers from a conflict of interest in which two of Sweden's largest political
parties view the model as fundamental to Swedish society but disagree on the meaning of “the
people.” This has had a profound impact on Swedish politics which, although ranking
consistently high in terms of democracy and freedom of expression, have struggled to reconcile a
massive cultural divide between the pro-human rights, open borders and internationalist Swedes
and the more conservative, nationalistic ones. A recent surge in crime has further exacerbated
this divide and the Sweden Democrats have wasted no time capitalizing on Swedes’ fears
surrounding the increase in gang violence in many of Sweden's major cities. They have been
massively successful in constructing the narrative that immigrants are responsible for these
crimes and in pushing many of Sweden’s major political parties further to the right on issues
such as immigration. As a result, Sweden is becoming more and more polarized and its core
values of democracy and egalitarianism are becoming increasingly contested.
Sweden is at an inflection point. The country's two largest political parties need to
reevaluate the Swedish model before the next election or else it risks fracturing itself even more
over issues like immigration. Swedes should ask themselves- Who are “the people?” What
constitutes “Swedishness” in the twenty-first century? This thesis seeks to answer these questions
by looking at the history of the people's home and trying to understand both sides' conception of
its core features. Chapter 1 lays out the history of the Swedish welfare system and shows how it
was constructed around the idea of a shared national identity. It then delves into the history of
immigration to Sweden and finds that it is a relatively new phenomenon. Chapter 2 examines the
history of Swedish far-right movements, beginning with the earlier Nazi parties and ending with
10

the Sweden Democrrats. It then explains how Sweden provided the ideal conditions for a
far-right populist movement to flourish despite the image we often have of Sweden as a tolerant
and welcoming country. Chapter 3 looks at the rhetoric surrounding the people’s home and how
politicians on both ends of the parliamentary spectrum interpret it. It finds that the people’s home
is an inherently contested concept that has been continuously used and misused throughout
history. Chapter 4 explores whether it is possible for Swedes to come up with a new definition of
the people’s home suitable for the twenty-first century that works for everyone. In doing so,
perhaps politicians can begin alleviating many of the ideological battles that Swedes face on a
daily basis. It also looks ahead to the 2022 Swedish election and explains the challenges that
Sweden faces moving forward.
There has never been a better time to study the far-right in Sweden. Many countries look
up to Sweden as a perfect model of social democracy. What this thesis finds is that the Swedish
model, while it initially had good intentions, became something easily appropriable by the
far-right much to the detriment of Swedish politics and society. Sweden can still be a great
country, but it needs to work out its flaws before the next election or else it risks losing what
makes it great altogether. In addition, Sweden's Nordic neighbors have already seen the far-right
become part of the mainstream and it leads to the question of whether Sweden is an anomaly in a
world increasingly defined by far-right movements or whether Sweden is finally catching up to
its European neighbours.

11

Chapter 1

In the mid-nineteenth century, Sweden was one of the poorest countries in the world. The
period between 1870 and 1970 saw Sweden become the fourth richest country in the world. The
country did remarkably well in combining high levels of economic growth with increasing
equality. For many, Sweden is proof that a generous welfare system is compatible with a
relatively free market economy. Today, the Swedish model is considered a “middle way”
between capitalism and socialism. What explains Sweden's success over the 100 year period
between 1870 and 1970?
Part of Sweden’s success story is attributed to the fact that the country is rich in natural
resources. In addition, Sweden remained neutral during both world wars and has stayed out of
wars for centuries. But these explanations only go so far as to explain Sweden's success since the
beginning of the twentieth century. In order to understand the true nature of the Swedish success
story, it is important to understand the history of the country starting with the prehistoric period
up to the present. In the following paragraphs, I will lay out Sweden's early and modern history
and hopefully shed light on what made the country so successful to begin with.

Sweden's Early History

Humans have inhabited the area that is present-day Sweden from as early as 12,000 BC.3
Between 1,200 BC and 1,000 BC, the Swedish population began settling down. Agriculture came

3

Sweden.se, “History of Sweden – More than Vikings: Official Site of Sweden,” sweden.se, August 14,
2020, https://sweden.se/society/history-of-sweden/.
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to form the basis of Sweden's economy and society during this time. Also during this time,
Sweden expanded its economic activity toward the east and created trading links with the
Byzantine Empire and Arabic Kingdoms. By the eleventh century, Sweden had become a
Christian nation.
Sweden did not begin encountering migration from other parts of the world until the late
twelfth century. During this time, a group of northern German towns formed a confederation
called the Hanseatic League. For almost three centuries, the Hanseatic League dominated trade
in the North Sea region. The Swedish cities of Visby and Stockholm soon became important
links in the Hanseatic trading network. However, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the
influence of the Hanseatic League started to decline and Sweden soon viewed them as an
unwanted competitor. In the Middle Ages, the German influence in Sweden contributed to the
country's urban development and even affected the development of the Swedish language.
Germany's influence in Sweden during this time would go on to have a profound impact on
Swedish attitudes toward immigration in the ensuing centuries all the way up until the twentieth
century.

Sweden's Modern History

Sweden did not become a great power until the seventeenth century. During that time, it
controlled a territory comprising present-day Finland as well as parts of Norway. The Swedish
Kingdom was home to Finns, Norwegians, Danes, Germans, Latvians, Russians, and Sammi all
living in the same territory. It was during this period that Sweden permitted, and sometimes even
enforced, people to move from one region to another. It was also around this same time that
13

Sweden began recruiting a professional class of industrial workers from neighboring countries.
These laborers would become crucial to Sweden's early development.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Sweden was involved in a number of
wars with Finland. The wars reduced Sweden to what Robert Weston referred to as “a small,
insignificant country in northern Europe.”4 By the mid-nineteenth century, Sweden's population
grew dramatically due to improvements in living conditions and land reforms. But within a few
years, a series of crop failures resulted in a famine that triggered a massive wave of migration to
North America that lasted until the 1930s. Although there has always been movement in and out
of Sweden, it was this wave of migration that left the deepest imprint on the country's
development.

Swedish Immigration History

Sweden did not technically become a country of immigration until World War II when
refugees from neighboring countries began settling in Sweden as a result of the war. Thousands
of migrants from Finland, Denmark, and Norway fled to Sweden to seek asylum following
persecution in their home countries. It was also during this time that Jewish people from Nazi
Germany began seeking asylum in Sweden. They were given jobs primarily in factories and in
the agricultural sector, jobs that would have otherwise gone to the Swedes who were called for
national defense service. But due to the fact that Sweden was trying to avoid conflict with Nazi
Germany, a majority of them were rejected. This is precisely the policy that intellectuals such as
4

Charles Westin, “Sweden: Restrictive Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism,” migrationpolicy.org,
March 2, 2017,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden-restrictive-immigration-policy-and-multiculturalism.
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Vilhelm Moberg were critical of in that it restricted movement at a time when Sweden was in
need of labor migrants from other countries.
During both World War I and World War II, Sweden pursued what Michael Byström
refers to as a policy of “neutrality and Nordicism.”5 This policy rested on the premise that
Sweden's responsibility toward refugees would apply only to those from Nordic countries.
Byström refers to this policy as “the Nordic prerogative.”6 Sweden’s refugee policy during this
time was considered restrictive and xenophobic by some observers while others argued that
Sweden’s labor market needed to be protected from foreign labor. At the same time, Sweden had
no official integration policy, meaning that refugees arriving in Sweden were required to figure it
out on their own. It is also worth noting that, because there was a high demand for labor, these
immigrants did not create any major societal problems.
By the end of the second world war, Sweden replaced its restrictive immigration policies
with more liberalized ones. The reason for this was that the country wanted to protect its security
at home and abroad. By opening the door to more immigrants, Swedes felt as though they were
in a better position than most other European countries during this time. Unlike other countries,
Sweden adopted an integration policy that treated labor migrants as future Swedish citizens.
During the middle of the twentieth century, there were virtually no limits on immigration from
countries such as Finland and those in southern Europe.
In addition to the recruitment of foreign labor, an increasing number of migrants began
arriving in Sweden on their own accord to find jobs. It was common knowledge that as long as
there were bountiful job opportunities in Sweden this would not become a problem. But the
5

Mikael Byström, “The Nordic Prerogative – An Explanatory Perspective on Swedish Refugee Policy
1942-1947,” DIVA, December 18, 2008,
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A183024.
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Swedish government was unaware of this growing flow of people in the 1960s. In Sweden, like
other Scandinaivan countries, labor migration from non-Nordic countries was officially ended in
the early 1970s. However, Sweden’s experience with immigration was only just beginning.
During the 1970s, labor migrants were replaced by refugees from various parts of the
world such as the Middle East and Latin America. Many of these migrants were granted asylum
on humanitarian grounds which allowed Sweden to live up to its commitments to the United
Nations following its signing of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in the
1950s.7 Over the years, the number of refugees fleeing persecution in their home countries
increased dramatically which prompted Sweden to return to a stricter asylum policy in the late
twentieth century. At the same time, refugees from the Bosnian War began seeking asylum in
Sweden and most were granted temporary residence permits. I will get more into this later in the
thesis.
It was during the postwar period that Sweden developed an image of itself as a
humanitarian superpower. This was especially true when it came to minority rights. Following
the second world war, a growing number of outside voices began drawing attention to the fact
that Sweden was still a relatively backwards country that didn't live up to some of its European
neighbors. Sweden's policy of neutrality and Nordicism during both world wars earned the
country a reputation as a soft power and Swedes wanted a way to lift themselves out of this
predicament. To put themselves in a better position, the Swedish government began drawing up
plans for a welfare state that would emphasise compassion and a willingness to help. It was this
decision to pursue a model of welfare that stressed humanitarian exceptionalism and earned
Sweden a reputation as a model social democracy. But at the same time, Sweden’s commitment
7

Westin, Charles.
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to a humane welfare system did not necessarily stem from moral considerations. Rather, scholars
like Mikael Byström argue that it derived from political motives that prioritized good relations
with neighboring Nordic countries. In this sense, the Nordic prerogative never really went away
and neither did many of its proponents.
Beginning in the 1970s, Sweden needed to figure out how to deal with migrants arriving
from southern Europe. Before the 1970s, Sweden had no oficial integration policy because it was
assumed that migrants from other Scandinavian countries would automatically assimilate since
their cultures were so similar. However, migrants were now arriving from different parts of the
world that most Swedes were unfamiliar with. Ironically, it was Sweden's conservative party that
advocated for a policy of cultural pluralism while the ruling Social Democratic Party was
skeptical about expanding minority rights for immigrants. This was because the Social
Democrats believed that a certain level of cultural homogeneity was necessary for successful
integration. As a sort of compromise, both parties introduced The 1975 Immigrant and Minority
Policy which combined cultural pluralism with the integrative logics of the welfare state.8
The 1975 Immigrant and Minority Policy affirmed Sweden's commitment to human rights
issues during the postwar period. Shortly after the introduction of this policy, more and more
asylum seekers and their families began arriving in Sweden. Sweden had taken a very liberal
approach toward immigration and a majority of Swedes seemed happy to be champions of
minority rights. However, critics of the policy argued that it promoted an essentialist viewpoint of
culture that regarded Nordic culture as somehow superior to others. This is an argument that has
arisen in recent years in regards to Sweden's integration policies which have changed on multiple
8

Karin Borevi. "The Political Dynamics of Multiculturalism in Sweden." In Challenging Multiculturalism:
European Models of Diversity, edited by Taras Raymond, 138-60. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2013. Accessed Jan 27, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt20q22fw.13.
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occasions throughout the twentieth century. It is important to understand that these policies did
not promote special institutions for ethnic groups. Rather, they combined cultural pluralism with
the integrative logics of the welfare state. This, in effect, promoted standardized institutional
arrangements that applied equally to all.9
The multicultural approach to Swedish integration policy began receiving serious
criticism during the 1980s. There was a question as to whether immigrants were required to
follow the same laws and norms that applied to the rest of the population. In addition, there was a
question as to what responsibility the state had toward these minority groups. In 1986, The 1975
Immigrant and Minority Policy was abandoned in favor of a new policy that would meet the
needs of Swedish citizens, not give special treatment to minority groups.10 It took nearly a decade
for the Swedish government to come up with a new integration policy that departed from the “us”
versus “them” narrative that defined Swedish integration policy throughout much of the twentieth
century. Since then, the goal of Swedish integration policy has been equal rights, obligations, and
opportunities for all regardless of ethnic or cultural background.11
Throughout much of the twentieth century, it was assumed that by providing immigrants
with similar rights to those of native citizens, immigrants would feel as though they belonged and
would be compelled to live up to certain standards. This might mean contributing to Swedish
society in whatever capacity possible or simply seeking employment in available industries. Up
until fairly recently, Sweden's integration policy was relatively unaltered and most Swedes felt as
though it was working for them. But as recently as 2015, a massive wave of immigration to
9

Borevi, 144.
Borevi, 147.
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Sweden changed many Swedes’ perception of the state's integrative logistics and there have been
calls to alter a once admired welfare system. But first, it is necessary to go over the history of the
Swedish welfare system beginning with the Social Democrats who are credited with creating the
welfare state we know today.

The Social Democrats

The story of the Swedish welfare state begins with the Social Democratic Party who,
prior to the twentieth century, were a relatively obscure faction of the Swedish polity. Over the
years, the Social Democrats became one of the most successful social democratic movements in
the world. They enjoyed over four decades of power before being voted out of office for a period
of time and reelected to head the Swedish government in 2014. Considering that there are four
other major political parties in Sweden, it is quite remarkable that the Social Democrats managed
to stay in power for such a long time. The extraordinary success of the Sweden Democrats rested
on their ability to construct a welfare state that emphasized “national community.” But before
they became successful, they were a largely unknown political party in Sweden.
The Social Democratic Party was founded in 1889 and became the first political party to
organize outside of the Riksdag. Nineteenth century Sweden had been characterized by radical
socialist and liberal ideology. During this time, Sweden began looking to other countries for new
ideas that quickly went against the old paternalistic order.12 In its early years, the Social
Democrats adhered to a strictly Marxist ideology but this quickly faded away following the

12

Richard F. Tomasson. "The Extraordinary Success of the Swedish Social Democrats." The Journal of
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party's decision to support the Liberal Party in the late nineteenth century. In 1896, Hjalmar
Branting was elected the Social Democrats’ first representative to the Riksdag. From here on out,
the party adopted a pragmatic approach to governing that would contribute to the success of the
Swedish welfare state in the years to come.
In 1917, the Social Democrats merged with the Liberal Party to form Sweden's first
parliamentary government. The coalition broke up in 1920 because the Liberals rejected the
Social Democrats’ radical approach to economic development and the Social Democrats formed
the first fully socialist government in the world achieved by peaceful means.13 As stated
previously, the Social Democrats adopted a more pragmatic model of socialism that departed
from the German and British influences it had been accustomed to. However, this was still
Depression-Era Sweden and roughly one million Swedes had migrated overseas in search of job
opportunities. Sweden was heavily impacted by the Great Depression and most Swedes struggled
to make ends meet. The country was far from the wealthy first-world nation we know today. It
was a land defined by political instability and economic hardship. But thanks to the visionary
leadership of figures like Hjalmar Branting, Sweden was able to lift itself out of this depression
that was practically bringing the country to its knees.
In addition to the poor economic conditions in Sweden at this time, there was a divide in
the Riksdag. The Conservative coalition was calling for authoritarian leadership to deal with
poverty while the ruling Social Democrats had a completely different idea. Hjalmar Branting, the
leader of the Social Democratic Party, had this to say-

13

Tomasson, 782.
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“In a backward land like Sweden we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the
middle class increasingly plays a very important role. The working class needs the
workers behind it in order to be able to hold out against our common enemies.”14

Branting’s pragmatic approach to alleviating poverty in Sweden set him apart from other
socialists in Europe at the time. Unlike political parties elsewhere, the Social Democrats
promised to use the democratic process to improve conditions for the average citizen. Rather
than using authoritarian control to deal with the issue, the Social Democrats thought it was best
to alleviate poverty by creating a new model of social democracy. However, the conservative
party argued that the Social Democrats were pitting the working class against the proletariat.
Despite the opposition, the Social Democrats went ahead with implementing this new model
under the leadership of a man by the name of Per Albin Hansson.

The People’s Home

In 1928, Per Albin Hansson became the new leader of the Social Democratic Party. That
same year, Hansson gave a speech to the Riksdag that many historians consider the most famous
oration in social democratic history. He stated,
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“The foundation of the home is community and solidarity. The good home knows
no privilege or neglect, no favorites and no stepchildren [...] In the good home equality,
thoughtfulness, cooperation, and helpfulness prevail.”15

Hansson is, of course, referring to the Swedish idea of folkhemmet, or, “the people’s
home.” Under this model, Swedish society would function as a good home absent of any
inequalities. This would include the breakdown of all socioeconomic barriers that divided
citizens into rich and poor. In order for Swedish society to become a good people’s home it first
needed to eliminate class distinctions. In addition, democracy had to be implemented in all
aspects of Swedish life. This was no easy task and many Swedes assumed that it could not be
done. However, Hansson and Branting shared a pragmatic mindset aimed at providing Swedish
citizens with a better quality of life. They did, after all, view themselves as no better than their
fellow citizens.
Hansson and Branting surrounded themselves with theorists and politicians who
advocated for increased economic production rather than the redistribution of an underdeveloped
economic base. During his time as leader of the Social Democrats, Hansson listened to these
figures and implemented policies that eased much of the suffering resulting from the Great
Depression. It was this sense of cooperation and pragmatic decision making that contributed to
the success of the Social Democrats and the Swedish model at this time. However, it was not
only wise economic policies and an overall spirit of pragmatism that contributed to Sweden's

15
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success. Hansson had introduced to Sweden, and the world, a new model of social democracy
that revolves around the idea of a “people’s home.”
The idea of a people’s home is not unique to Sweden. Different countries have their own
version of a people’s home that signifies a national family bound together by a common national
identity. Historians like Jenny Andersson argue that what “the Empire” is to British national
identity, and “la Republique” is to the French, so “Folkhemmet” is to Swedish national identity.16
Although these British and French slogans pertaining to national identity are mostly a thing of
the past, they still play an important role in how their respective countries are perceived by both
insiders and outsiders. Each of these terms have their own unique history that can provide useful
insight into how and why important changes take place. In Sweden's case, folkhemmet became a
political metaphor that influenced Swedish domestic politics for much of the twentieth century.
While some Swedes would argue that folkhemmet no longer retains the status it once did in
Swedish society, it still has important significance in Sweden today.
Folkhemmet has no English equivalent. The literal translation is loose and clunky and fails
to capture the central idea of the political metaphor which is “the home.” Scholars like Andrew
Brown argue that the best way to conceptualize folkhemmet is to think of it as a family.17 Similar
to traditional families, the members of the people’s home must learn to live with each other
despite their differences, or at least learn to live with their shared hatred of each other. Like a
family, members of folkhemmet are bound together by innate covenants rather than voluntary
contracts. In this sense, folkhemmet, much like families themselves, becomes a profoundly
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iliberal institution. Swedes, of course, would argue that folkhemmet is anything but iliberal and is
necessary to maintaining a healthy democracy.
While there exists this conception of folkhemmet, others argue that folkhemmet was
merely a certain period in Swedish history when the Social Democratic Party was first in power.
However, it seems more likely that folkhemmet is an actual political metaphor that some Swedes
use in daily life today. More so than most other national ideologies, folkhemmet is deeply
ingrained into the psyche of Swedish society and many Swedes consider it a pillar of their
democracy. But how did folkhemmet make its way to Sweden and why did it become so wildly
popular among Swedish politicians during the first half of the twentieth century?
The term folkhemmet comes from the German slogan volksgemeinschaft, or, “the people’s
community.”18 It was originally used during the first world war to rally Germans in support of the
war and create a shared sense of national unity. Many Germans thought that by doing this, it
would break down class divides and unite Germany around a common national identity.
However, the slogan soon became used by Nazi Germany. David Welch suggests that the main
goal of Nazi propoganda was to restructure German society and create a new national awareness
that would replace exiting class, religious, and sectional loyalties.19 Such a conception of national
identity is eerily similar to that created by Per Albin Hansson in the early twentieth century.
Interestingly, folkhemmet and its Nazi connotations are believed to be part of the reason why the
term was initially downplayed by many Swedes in the years following the second world war.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the slogan volksgemeinschaft was brought to
Sweden by right-wing political scientist Rudolf Kjellen. Kjellen had spent a number of years
18
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studying and working in Germany where he was first introduced to the idea of a people’s
community. There is debate as to how exactly the term entered the political mainstream in
Sweden during its early years. Left-wing figures, in particular, became attracted to the idea of a
national community, most likely because it stressed ideals such as collectivism and shared
responsibility which were attractive to the socialist left. Figures such as Per Albin Hansson were
particularly successful in transforming the people’s community from a tool of Nazi propoganda
into a left-wing political slogan. As a result, Hansson was able to lift Sweden out of an economic
depression that affected most, if not all, Swedes, but the working class in particular.
During his earlier years as leader of the Social Democrats, Per Albin Hansson introduced
work relief programs that mitigated the detrimental effects of the depression. In doing so,
Hansson lifted a great deal of the population out of poverty. In the past, Europe’s socialist parties
tended to overlook working class people like farmers. Hansson, in contrast, reached out to the
working class and made them a part of folkhemmet. This is part of the reason why the Social
Democrats remained in power for so long and turned Sweden into the successful social
democracy we see today.
Central to this chapter is the idea that folkhemmet is inextricably linked to the Swedish
welfare system, so much so that the two are often used interchangeably. For this reason,
folkhemmet is still important to this day, although most Swedes would argue that it is
significantly less important than it once was. The concept’s ties to Nazism during its early years
merits closer attention and is part of the reason that it is not as prominent today. Ironically,
Nazism would return to Sweden in the ensuing years in the form of far-right political movements
that seem to contradict everything the country stands for. Many of these fringe parties started out
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as Nazi organizations before evolving into far-right political parties that would go on to hold
significant power in Sweden. In the following chapter, I will introduce the Swedish far-right
which, up until recently, was a much maligned and insignificant faction of the Swedish voting
bloc. However, in recent years, political parties like the Sweden Democrats have seen their
support increase with each election cycle. Why might this be the case?

Chapter 2

It is hard to imagine that a country as liberal as Sweden could be home to far-right
political parties like the Sweden Democrats. But in 2010, the Sweden Democrats entered the
Riksdag for the first time with 5.7% of the vote. It was an unprecedented feat for a political party
that had been ignored for decades. Jimmie Åkesson, the leader of the Sweden Democrats since
2005, remarked that his party would take this opportunity to make its voice heard.20 He went on
to declare that the Sweden Democrats could finally speak out on the issues that mattered most
and influence Swedish politics. According to some observers, 2010 was the first year that the
Sweden Democrats successfully tapped into voter fears surrounding the issue of immigration.
While many considered the victory of the Sweden Democrats an anomaly that undermined
Sweden’s reputation as a tolerant and welcoming country, others weren't so taken aback by the
victory of the Sweden Democrats.
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The Swedish Far-Right

In order to understand the recent success of the Sweden Democrats, it is important to
understand the making of the Swedish far-right. While it is likely that far-right ideologies had
existed in Sweden prior to the twentieth century, it was not until this time that they manifested
themselves in the form of Nazi organizations and far-right political parties. Following the second
world war, it was assumed that Nazism and hatred toward Jewish people had been more or less
eradicated because of Nazi defeat. In reality, hateful ideologies were alive and well on the fringes
of Swedish society. One man by the name of Per Engdahl was particularly instrumental in
sending Sweden back to a darker past.
In 1926, Per Engdahl, a prominent far-right activist, founded the Fascist People’s Party of
Sweden, or, Sveriges Fascistiska Folkparti, a fascist and eventually Nazi political party in
Sweden. The party initially supported Italian fascism but went on to promote Nazi ideology in its
later years. In 1930, it was replaced by the Swedish National Socialist Party, or, Svenska
nationalsocialistiska partiet. This was the first true Nazi movement in Sweden. After a series of
unsuccessful election bids, the party was dissolved in 1936. In 1941, Engdahl founded the New
Swedish Movement, or, Nysvenska Rörelsen, which promoted Swedish nationalism and
anti-communism. The movement also promoted a “new Swedishness” and supported the Third
Reich in Nazi Germany.
During his time as leader of the New Swedish Movement, Per Engdahl was a proponent
of a particular brand of socialism that he termed a “people’s community,” which appeared earlier
in this thesis. Engdahl’s movement was called everything from “racist” to “anti-semitic.”
Engdahl himself went so far as to declare white Western culture racially homogenous. Some
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scholars have described the party as “little more than a discussion club for intellectuals.”21
However, the New Swedish Movement had a considerable influence on other far-right
movements that would arise in Sweden in the ensuing years.
Before Per Engdahl disappeared completely from the Nazi movement in Sweden, he
founded one last organization that he tied to other Nazi movements called “Keep Sweden
Swedish,” or, Bevara Sverige Svenskt. Engdahl had been inspired by other postwar fascist
organizations, some of which he created himself over the years. The party quickly became well
known in Sweden for spewing racist rhetoric and inciting violence. According to the party, their
main goal was to spark a debate surrounding immigration in an effort to stop non-European
immigration and repatriate non-ethnic Swedes.22 The party’s platform was highly controversial,
not only to the vast majority of Swedes, but also to figures on the right who considered the party
too far-right to ever garner success in Sweden. Oddly enough, the slogan “Keep Swedish
Swedish” is still used by many Swedish nationalists today.
In 1987, a group of members from Keep Sweden Swedish merged with the right-wing
populist Progress Party, forming the far-right Sweden Party. However, the merger was unstable,
and within months, the coalition broke apart with some members of the two parties coming
together to form the Sweden Democrats, or, Sverigedemokraterna. During the party’s earlier
years, it frequently collaborated with the White Aryan Resistance and had a number of
membership overlaps with other neo-Nazi and skinhead organizations.23 The party’s first few
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leaders had been arrested for making anti-semitic remarks toward prominent public figures and
for being open Nazis. At this point, some members of the Sweden Democrats recognized that
they needed to legitimize their party by purging these types of people. Mikael Jansson, a former
member of the Center Party, became party leader in 1995. Jansson quickly began removing Nazis
and other criminals from the party’s membership rolls which seemed to work. The Sweden
Democrats saw their poll numbers go up with each election cycle. However, it would not be until
2010 that the Sweden Democrats would enter the Riksdag for the first time with 5.7% of the
vote.
The Sweden Democrats’ inability to put forward a respectable façade is largely why they
were unsuccessful prior to 2010. Under new leadership, the party managed to rebrand itself by
invoking nostalgia for the good old days of, ironically, social democratic rule. Gabriella Elgenius
and Jens Rydgren argue that the Sweden Democrats adopted a decidedly ethnocentric platform
that suggested a “decay” of the golden ages of relative cultural homogeneity.24 In other words,
the Sweden Democrats’ success is contingent on the idea that Sweden is under the threat of a
changing demographic due to immigration and the only way to preserve the Swedish way of life
is by voting for their party. In effect, the Sweden Democrats are promoting an ethnonationalist
message that departs from the traditional idea of Swedish exceptionalism. The 2010 election was
a signal of this departure from traditional values of openness and tolerance toward those of
nativism and ethnic homogeneity. But this message is to a large extent nothing more than an
imagined past, especially when you consider how the Sweden Democrats often over exaggerate

24

Gabriella Elgenius and Jens Rydgren, “Frames of Nostalgia and Belonging: the Resurgence of
Ethno-Nationalism in Sweden,” European Societies 21, no. 4 (2018): pp. 583-602,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494297.

29

the reality of what is happening in Sweden. In a 2018 campaign video, Jimmie Åkesson painted a
very bleak picture of Sweden and the threat to its welfare state when he stated,

“In parts of our country there is a civil war between rival gangs [...] In Sweden
terror is now a reality. Swedes are attacked, maimed, and killed on their own streets.”25

In this quote, Jimmie Åkesson is conveying the message that Sweden is in the midst of a
civil war, a far cry from the original idea of folkhemmet which suggested that Sweden should
look like a well ordered and secure society. But the Sweden Democrats’ argument is that
folkhemmet is more or less a homogeneous entity that needs to be preserved for the sake of
protecting the welfare state. The only solution is to elect the Sweden Democrats because their
platform calls for an end to mass immigration. Mass immigration, they argue, is a threat to the
unity and security of the Swedish state. This is the Sweden Democrats’ vision of folkhemmet; the
return to an imagined past. As we will see in the next chapter, the Sweden Democrats have stuck
to this message throughout most of their history and figures such as Jimmie Åkesson invoke it on
a regular basis.
At the intersection of this imagined past and envisioned future lies the dystopian present
in which the Sweden Democrats have fashioned themselves as the only political party capable of
saving Sweden from impending doom. It is at this intersection that the Sweden Democrats
emerge as a populist political party claiming to be leading Sweden on a new path away from
multiculturalism and toward monoculturalism. In the following section, I will illustrate how
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populist political parties can emerge in unforeseen ways much to the chagrin of establishment
parties.

The Sweden Democrats and its “Entry Points”

In the last decade, countries around the world have witnessed an unprecedented level of
support for far-right populist political parties. From Victor Orban’s so-called “illiberal
democracy” in Hungary, to the surprising victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election, there is no denying that far-right populism is on the rise. What these populist leaders all
share is a common disdain for their countries' establishment political parties. Populist figures like
Donald Trump challenge liberal democratic norms by claiming that the establishment parties’
policies weaken democracy and hurt everyday people. This recent pattern of populist revolt
comes into conflict with the same ideals that advanced liberal democracies throughout the 1990s.
So, what happened?
In his essay, “The End of History?” Francis Fukuyama argues that, following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, humanity has reached a point where Western liberal democracy
is the final form of government for all advanced nations.26 A famous political intellectual,
Fukuyama had several reasons for why he believed that liberal democracy would define the world
in the years to come. His belief rested on the premise that there could be no alternative system to
that of Western liberal democracy. Other theorists supported his hypothesis by pointing to the
fact that liberal ideas had been successful throughout history and, because of this, they would
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continue to be successful in the years to come. While some figures began embracing this type of
historical determinism, its political justification became weaker. Critics pointed to the fact that
people all have different ideas of what freedom should be and they drew attention to the
unlikelihood that some historical doctrine could govern the course of history.
While this explanation of Francis Fukuyama’s hypothesis that we have reached the end of
history might seem like a tangent from the topic at hand, it actually relates directly to Vilhelm
Moberg’s essay which I introduced at the beginning of this thesis. In his essay, Moberg discusses
the idea of freedom and suggests that Sweden is founded on freedom. For a long time, it seemed
as though Swedes had a common definition of freedom. Freedom, to a Swedish person, implied
freedom through the welfare state, or, folkhemmet. Freedom, democracy, and equality were the
three main pillars of Swedish society beginning in the 1930s. But in recent years, Swedes’
understanding of freedom has seemingly come into conflict with itself. What does freedom mean
in the context of emerging political parties with diametrically opposing views to those of the
Social Democrats? In order to better understand this, it is important to understand the politics of
populism and how the Sweden Democrats became so successful in the first place.
Cas Mudde defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups.”27 In other words, populism pits the
“pure” people against the “corrupt” elite. Populism is based on the idea that politics should
express the general will of the people. Populist political parties oppose establishment political
parties and call for the formation of a political party that will put the interests of those that they
assume to belong to the “in-group” first. Multicultural policies, like the 1975 Immigrant and
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Minority Policy, extended the “us” group to include the formerly excluded. Sara Goodman notes
that any liberal democracy that redefines citizenship in the way that Sweden did in 1975 opens
itself up to populist challenge.28
This is exactly what we see happening in Sweden with regard to the success of the
Sweden Democrats, a populist political party that entered the political arena at a time when
Sweden's ideological borders were not salient. In the years since the introduction of the 1975
Immigrant and Minority Policy, Sweden has changed its citizenship requirements on multiple
occasions, allowing room for the Sweden Democrats to grow. As the Sweden Democrats have
increased in popularity, they have also contributed to the fracturing of Swedish society and
politics by putting into question the meaning behind the welfare state and, more specifically,
folkhemmet. As Sara Goodman points out, liberal democracies and populism are on an
unavoidable collision course. Liberal democracies like Sweden are in a constant state of limbo
trying to balance economic openness and sociopolitical closure. Goodman refers to this as “the
liberal paradox.”29
It is important to mention that populism is not always a bad thing. It can also be the
voters' reaction to the undemocratic nature of liberal institutions. Populist politicians can make
democracy more representative by mobilizing new voters, thereby improving democratic
institutions. However, in Sweden's case, populism can also threaten the very existence of liberal
democracy. In other words, populists can reject the concept of cultural pluralism altogether and
embrace a policy of cultural exclusion. We see this happening with the Sweden Democrats who
have appropriated the concept of folkhemmet and turned it into something exclusionary rather
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than inclusionary. At the same time, the ambiguous nature of Swedish citizenship laws
throughout much of the twentieth century gave the Sweden Democrats the opportunity to
appropriate the concept for their own political advantage.
Today, Sweden finds itself in what Sara Goodman would call a “liberal paradox.” Over
the years, the country has attempted to promote both cultural pluralism and political closure.
During this time, the Social Democrats have enabled contestation by espousing values such as
pluralism, tolerance, and neutrality. The Sweden Democrats have contested these ideals by
entering the Riksdag and pushing many of Sweden's political parties further to the right on issues
such as immigration. The party's focus on immigration has been politically strategic in that it
claims to be protecting the “pure people” from immigrant “outsiders.” For this reason, the
Sweden Democrats are a classic example of a populist political party that garners support
through populist entry points.

The 2015 Refugee Crisis

It would be wrong to discuss the Sweden Democrats without drawing attention to their
ability to have capitalized off of the massive influx of refugees who entered Sweden between
2015 and 2016. During this time, the Sweden Democrats saw their popularity increase as
evidenced by their success in the 2018 general election. It was during this period that the Sweden
Democrats managed to push many of Sweden's more established political parties further to the
right on issues like immigration. While there has always been some movement of people in and
out of Sweden, the country was ill prepared to handle immigration at such an extreme level in
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2015. As we will come to see, the Sweden Democrats positioned themselves as the only political
party in Sweden that could handle such a challenge.
Throughout 2015, hundreds of thousands of people fled across the Mediteranean Sea
escaping war and persecution in their home countries. Initially, Sweden was happy to welcome
refugees with open arms. These people had crossed the most treacherous terrain, survived the
most brutal weather conditions, and encountered the most unforgiving political bureaucracies
that would ultimately decide their future. It was no easy task and many refugees, particularly
those fleeing the civil war in Syria, heard about the generous asylum policies in countries like
Germany and Sweden. Because of this, many refugees viewed Sweden as their final destination
on their journey toward a better future.
Prior to 2015, Sweden's immigration policies were considered very generous, especially
when compared to those of other European countries. One of Sweden's most liberal policies was
introduced in 2013 when the Swedish government decided to issue permanent resident permits to
people arriving in Sweden from war torn Syria.30 There is reason to believe that this policy was
responsible for the massive influx of refugees that arrived in Sweden from Syria beginning in the
early months of 2015. It was around this same time that immigration became a salient issue in
Swedish politics.
To many onlookers, the 2015 refugee crisis marked the end of Swedish exceptionalism. It
was around this time that the Sweden Democrats became a legitimate force in the Riksdag and
were in a position to influence policy for years to come. This is not to say that the Sweden
Democrats did not face any backlash, because they certainly did, even from the right. However, it
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did signal a new era of Swedish politics wherein once maligned parties like the Sweden
Democrats, running on an aggressively anti-immigration platform, could expect a significant
share of the vote in upcoming elections.

The 2018 Swedish Election

It had been eight years since the Sweden Democrats first entered the Riksdag and the
party was making more gains with each election cycle. The 2018 election was considered by
many observers to be a referendum on Sweden's immigration policies that some Swedes viewed
as too generous toward immigrants. In response to the 2015 refugee crisis, Sweden implemented
temporary border controls in an effort to control immigration into the country. This was largely
in response to the Sweden Democrats’ narrative that immigrants arriving in Sweden from
countries like Syria were a threat to the nation.
Before 2016, anyone in need of a residence permit generally received one. In the case of
Syrian refugees, those who had fled the civil war were given temporary residence permits that,
after a certain period of time, could become permanent. Then, in 2016, Sweden passed
legislation that required all municipalities in the country to take in a certain number of refugees.
While this sounds like it could work in theory, it allowed the Sweden Democrats to adopt the
narrative that immigrants are criminals who commit crimes and take part in gang violence, even
though this is often not the case. During the debates preceding the 2018 election, the Sweden
Democrats used this narrative to portray immigrants as a threat to Swedish society.
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In Sweden, there are several debates before every election and during each election cycle
there are a number of issues that the candidates wish to tackle. During the 2018 election, the
most important debate topic by far was immigration. Although Sweden had limited the number
of immigrants arriving in the country following the 2015 refugee crisis, anxieties surrounding
crime and increased gang violence were high among Swedish voters. Unsurprisingly, throughout
the debate, the Sweden Democrats pushed the narrative that immigrants were responsible for
most, if not all, of these crimes.31 The party also argued that these same immigrants were placing
a strain on the Swedish welfare state by taking advantage of many of the country's generous
welfare programs. Although the wellbeing of the Swedish welfare state is important to all parties
involved, party leaders recognized that the Sweden Democrats’ claims were heavily race-based
rather than based on actual facts and data. While there has been an increase in crime in recent
decades, there is little evidence to suggest that it is directly the result of generous immigration
policies.32
Also during the debate, almost every single party leader referred to the Sweden
Democrats as “racists” and “xenophobes” at one point or another. Swedish Prime Minister Stefan
Löfven went so far as to declare that the Social Democrats would never work with the far-right.
He called out some of his opponents for expressing a willingness to work with the Sweden
Democrats. Former Prime Minister Carl Bildt expressed similar sentiments, noting that the
Sweden Democrats’ success is a sign that Sweden should begin taking their views more
seriously. Polls conducted around this time showed that many of the country's establishment
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parties were losing support and, in response, they adopted more hardline immigration policies in
an effort to meet the needs of, and reduce the fears among Swedes.
Around this same time, Sweden began attracting the attention of the United States.
During a campaign rally in Florida in February 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump stated,

“You look at what is happening in Sweden - Sweden, who would believe this?
They took in large numbers, and they're having problems like they never thought
before.”33

Politicians around the world were quick to respond in confoundment to the President's
remarks. What was he talking about? It is most likely that Trump was referring to Sweden's
immigration policies before the 2015 refugee crisis. Kim Hjelmgaard suggests that he was
referring to a nonexistent terror attack in Sweden to bolster his calls for tighter immigration
policies.34 In other words, Trump might have been making the point that even liberal democracies
like Sweden can reach a breaking point and decide to limit immigration from certain countries. In
Hjelmgaard’s interview with Amy Horowitz, she explains how Sweden is representative of a
liberal bastion that differs from the United States when it comes to Sweden having open
immigration policies, higher taxes, and a more comprehensive welfare state.
Donald Trump's comments in the early months of his presidency represent an
international interest in Swedish politics that, although not often cited, might be viewed as a
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litmus test of sorts when it comes to handling immigration, particularly in liberal democracies.
Both Denmark and Norway have already witnessed the proliferation of far-right political parties
that have managed to form coalition governments with the more mainstream parties. The
question is not if but when the Sweden Democrats will catch up to their Scandinavian
counterparts.
In the 2018 election, the Sweden Democrats received almost 18% of the vote. While they
had anticipated a higher percentage, it still represented the largest gain by any party in the
Riksdag. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats saw their share of the vote fall to nearly 28%, its
lowest since 1911. The Sweden Democrats had become Sweden's fastest growing political force.
But while some parties have adopted more hardline immigration policies following the successes
of the Sweden Democrats, the Social Democrats have been very vocal in their opposition toward
the party, having gone so far as to call them the Nazis of today.35
In this chapter, I have attempted to present the history of the Swedish far-right, beginning
with the earlier Nazi movements, and ending with the Sweden Democrats, Sweden’s
fastest-growing political party. What we find is that the Sweden Democrats have been largely
successful in seizing the concept of folkhemmet and transforming it into a tool of exclusion that,
in many ways, contradicts what it originally set out to accomplish. In the following chapter, I will
explain why Sweden's crisis of identity is largely attributable to the loose definition of
folkhemmet. As we have seen, there is still debate as to what exactly constitutes folkhemmet and
Swedish identity as a whole. While the term is important to both the Social Democrats and the
Sweden Democrats, they have diametrically opposing views as to what it implies. Folkhemmet
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was, after all, never enacted into law as much as it was used as a political slogan throughout
much of the twentieth century. At the same time, folkhemmet had a profound effect on the
success of the Swedish welfare state during the early part of the twentieth century.

Chapter 3

By now it is understood that the concept of folkhemmet is important to all of Sweden's
major political parties. In recent years, folkhemmet has re-emerged as a core feature of Swedish
society and it is difficult to understand exactly why this is the case. Unlike other countries, the
welfare state is viewed favorably by both conservatives and liberals. But for whatever reason,
both the Social Democrats and the Sweden Democrats are divided on the meaning of “the
people.” In this chapter, I will analyze rhetoric from both sides surrounding the concept of
folkhemmet in hopes of both illustrating an ideological fracture as well as getting to the root of
what it means to be a Swedish citizen.

A Home for Whom?

Folkhemmet was successful in two main ways. First, it laid the foundation for the
Swedish welfare state. Second, it became a marker of Swedish identity and what it meant to be
Swedish. For many decades, it represented a shared national identity that other countries could
look to and say, “that’s Sweden.” Because of this, Sweden's understanding of itself became
increasingly tied to the welfare project, so much so that, at one point, to be a Swedish citizen
meant being a member of folkhemmet and the Swedish welfare model. In recent years, the
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concept has re-emerged as a symbol of Swedish national identity, but in two different ways. Only
one of these ways mirrors what the Social Democrats had initially intended that it would
accomplish.
Every year, some 45,000 visitors descend on the Swedish island of Götland for
Almedalen Week, a major annual political event in Sweden. The event features workshops,
speeches, debates, and seminars. Many Swedes consider it the most important forum in Swedish
politics. Representatives from Sweden's major political parties take turns giving speeches. The
Social Democrats have a long history of speaking at Almedalen. The Sweden Democrats have
only recently begun speaking at Almedalen, largely because of the party’s controversial history.
Many people even criticized the event for giving a platform to a political party with neo-Nazi
roots.
Prior to 2012, the Sweden Democrats held an annual event at the party leader’s home in
Sölvesborg, Sweden. The party would discuss issues such as crime, gang violence, and
unemployment. They were known to attack the other major parties in Sweden, claiming that they
were not really watching out for the Swedish people. It was not until the party was introduced at
Almedalen that these far-right views entered the national spotlight. It raised a serious question as
to whether it was the establishment politicians or the populists that had the right idea when it
comes to what constitutes “Swedishness.” So, what exactly did they have to say about this idea of
Swedishness?
In her 2010 speech at Almedalen Week, the Social Democrats’ Party Leader Mona Sahlin
stated,
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“My vision for Sweden is a Sweden where everybody, regardless of their
background, can strive to achieve their dreams [...] We should be a party for freedom and
solidarity in the world [...] Sweden has a long history of solidarity and international
cooperation.”36

It is worth mentioning that the term folkhemmet did not begin reappearing in the rhetoric
of the Social Democratic Party or the Sweden Democrats until around 2014. It was during this
time that immigration from different countries like Syria prompted Swedish politicians to
reassess what it meant to be Swedish. In her speech, Sahlin depicts Sweden as a welcoming
country that does not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, etc. Sweden is essentially open
to anyone who wants to become a part of Swedish society. Over the years, the Social Democrats
have maintained this position, although even Stefan Löfven has recognized that Sweden needs to
be careful with who it lets into the country for security reasons.
The Sweden Democrats could not be more different in their approach toward
immigration. From the get go, the Sweden Democrats adopted the position that immigrants in
general pose an existential threat to the Swedish welfare state. Before the Sweden Democrats
were even welcomed to participate in Almedalen Week, the party had already criticized the
Swedish government for being too generous when it came to immigration policies. Perhaps the
best example of this came from Jimmie Åkesson’s 2010 speech at Sölvesborg in which he stated,
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“It scares me that we have a prime minister who says that it was not us Swedish
people who built Sweden, but people who came from other countries [...] Therefore, our
long term goal must be to form an alternative government created by the Swedish people
that can steer this country in another direction.”37

This rhetoric suggests that folkhemmet belongs exclusively to the native Swedish people.
It is as though only native Swedes can contribute to the welfare state that they worked so hard to
create. Historically speaking, it was not only “native” Swedes who helped build the Swedish
welfare system. As I mentioned earlier, Sweden borrowed ideas from other countries like
Germany and Great Britain, including the ideas of a national community as well as specific
welfare policies that the country was eager to try out. Of course, labor migrants from different
parts of Europe also contributed to the success of the welfare state.
Unlike the Social Democrats, the Sweden Democrats are making distinctions on the basis
of race, ethnicity, etc. This is a slippery slope considering how Sweden accepted labor migrants
from different parts of Europe who looked quite different from what you might call an ethnic
Swede. But this is something that the Sweden Democrats purposely overlook in an attempt to
(re)construct folkhemmet along ethnic lines. The Sweden Democrats’ vision for Sweden is a
country where its people all look more or less alike because this signals that they participated in
the construction of folkhemmet.
It is worth noting that Åkesson’s suggestion that only his party can steer Sweden in the
right direction reinstates the populist appeal that the Sweden Democrats have. Even on their
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webpage, the Sweden Democrats stress that they are the party best suited to deal with the biggest
challenges facing Sweden, in particular, immigration.38 Following several terrorist events in
Europe in 2014, the Sweden Democrats started playing more and more into voters’ fears
surrounding terrrorism in an attempt to garner support. In his 2014 summer speech at
Sölvesborg, Jimmie Åkesson stated,

“It is no longer possible to ignore Islamism and its bloody borders [...] Sweden
and the West must view and treat Islamism similar to how we have previously viewed and
treated other conquering and totalitarian ideologies. Islamism is today’s Nazism and
Communism.”39

In Åkesson’s speech, it becomes clear that the Sweden Democrats oppose all forms of
extremism. Åkesson recognizes that Sweden has a long history of dealing with opposing
ideologies and he would like to treat islamism the same as nazism or communism. It is rather
ironic that a party with roots in the neo-Nazi movement would express fear over these same
forces. At the same time, it makes sense when you consider that Jimmie Åkesson would likely
never admit to the fact that his party was once heavily associated with these hideous ideologies.
It would be politically unwise for Åkesson to confess to this, but at the same time, he could
acknowledge that Sweden does have an unfortunate history of Nazi organizations, but that his
party would like to move on from this dark past. Still, some Swedes claim that there are
undercover Nazis who are members of the Sweden Democrats today. Unsurprisingly, the Social
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Democrats have a very different view of what constitutes extremism. In his 2018 speech at
Almedalen Week, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated,

“I will take the fight for Swedish democracy, characterized by respect and
humanity. I will do everything in our power in the EU, so that Europe will never again
fall into the darkness of hatred [...] We must all do our part to strengthen the community
and democracy [...] It will not break if we stick together!”40

Based on their speeches, both the Social Democratic Party and the Sweden Democrats are
united in their hatred toward extremists but the two parties have opposing views as to what
constitutes hatred and darkness. In this speech, it becomes clear that the Social Democrats
consider the Sweden Democrats to be the extremists and the single greatest threat to Swedish
democracy. Meanwhile, the Sweden Democrats consider islamists the extremists and the biggest
threat to Swedish democracy. The Sweden Democrats do not view themselves as part of the
problem. Rather, they consider themselves protectors of the Swedish welfare state that Sweden
worked so hard to create.
Both the Social Democrats and the Sweden Democrats have their own conceptions of the
modern folkhemmet. In recent years, folkhemmet has been used more and more in each of these
parties’ political speeches. At the same time, the concept needs a new definition because,
although both parties recognize its importance, they are divided on what it means. For that
reason, I have identified two speeches that illustrate the ideological differences between the two
40
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parties when it comes to the concept of folkhemmet. In his 2014 speech at Almedalen Week,
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated,

“Few countries have as much potential as Sweden [...] If we want to take
advantage of Sweden's full potential, we need to see each other as sisters and brothers [...]
We must shape society as we want a good family to be [...] This is modern solidarity. It is
folkhem in the twenty-first century.”41

The Social Democrats see folkhemmet as a home where each member treats the other like
a sibling or parent. Again, they are emphasizing Sweden's commitment to solidarity with the
international community. Whether this means accepting refugees from other countries or
promoting global solidarity, the Social Democrats want you to recognize that they are a big tent
party and Sweden should resemble this model. Sweden will succeed in the twenty-first century
by taking advantage of the opportunity to become one big family. Meanwhile, the Sweden
Democrats have a different approach to the modern folkhemmet. In his 2018 speech at Almedalen
Week, Jimmie Åkesson stated,

“It scares me that my kids will grow up in a segregated society without feeling the
security I experienced growing up [...] Stefan Lofven and other party leaders, you have
destroyed the people’s home. We are building a new one [...] This election is a
referendum on the Swedish welfare system and Sweden’s future.”42
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Like the Social Democrats, the Sweden Democrats also want to see a modern version of
folkhemmet. The Sweden Democrats take a drastically different approach by playing into voters’
fears surrounding an increase in crime and gang violence. Jimmie Åkesson is invoking an
imagined past, as we saw before, that portrays the old Sweden as an idyllic society where there
was a high level of safety and security. Åkesson wants to return to the so-called good old days of
social democratic rule when Sweden was more or less culturally homogeneous. Ironically, this
was also the time when the Social Democrats were in power and building the welfare state. In
this sense, both parties seem to want similar things but they are divided on how to get there.
The information presented in this section suggests that folkhemmet is an inherently
contested concept. Throughout their history, the Social Democrats have considered folkhemmet
to be inclusive and open to everyone. In contrast, the Sweden Democrats believe that folkhemmet
belongs to the Swedish people and therefore they tend to look at it through an exclusionary lens.
If we are going by the original intentions of folkhemmet, then the Social Democrats have the
right idea when it comes to whose home it is. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that
Sweden is no longer the country it was one hundred years ago. When you dig a little deeper, you
discover that there is a whole other dimension to folkhemmet when it comes to the very idea of
what it means to be Swedish.
In the following chapter, I will talk about the approaches that we can take toward arriving
at a new definition of folkhemmet that works for everyone. In order to do so, it is necessary to
first try and understand what defines, not just Swedish, but Scandinavian culture as a whole. It
turns out that a large number of people have already studied this subject and have arrived at some
interesting conclusions when it comes to what constitutes “Scandinavianism.”
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Chapter 4

In the last several chapters, I explained how folkhemmet is an inherently contested
concept that has been used and misused over the years. Both of Sweden's major political parties
agree that folkhemmet is important to Swedish society and identity but they are divided on how to
approach it in daily life. While the term is meant to be inclusionary, there is little argument that
Swedes are divided on who should benefit from it. The Social Democratic Party argues that
everyone can belong to folkhemmet while the Sweden Democrats argue that it should be reserved
for native Swedish people. In this chapter, I delve into what constitutes Swedishness and explore
whether Swedes can arrive at a new definition of folkhemmet that works for everyone.

Defining “Swedishness”

Earlier in this thesis, I explained how Sweden was obliged to take in Nordic refugees
following the second world war. They did this under the assumption that the Nordic countries all
share a common culture and set values. This is sometimes referred to as “Scandinavianism.”43
But do the Nordic countries really have their own culture? Or was this perhaps a tactic to reduce
immigration during the postwar period? Similarly, is it something that the Swedish government
still takes into account when processing asylum applications today? Based on official data, it is
unlikely that the Swedish government considers one's country of origin to be the deciding factor
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when it comes to letting in refugees.44 But what is not so clear is whether or not the Nordic
countries do in fact have their own culture. In 2002, Mona Sahlin gave a speech where she stated,

“I cannot figure out what Swedish culture is. I think that's what makes many Swedes
jealous of immigrant groups. You have a culture, an identity, a history, something that brings you
together. And what do we have? We have Midsummer’s Eve and such silly things.”45

I would argue that Sweden's lack of culture is its culture. The country is essentially a
blank canvas ready to be complemented by new and unfamiliar cultures. For this reason,
politicians like Sahlin might argue that Sweden should be willing to accept immigrants from all
backgrounds because this is part of its identity. Up until 2015, the country's welcoming attitude
toward refugees was part of its identity, but since then, Sweden has had to reconcile two
opposing ideologies arising from the concept of folkhemmet. So far, this has proven to be mostly
unsuccessful. In the following section, I will try to establish a new understanding of folkhemmet
that works in this day and age.

Toward a New Definition of Folkhemmet

The original purpose of folkhemmet was to create a society based on freedom, equality,
and the rule of law. During much of the twentieth century, folkhemmet was considered a success
44
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in that it provided the necessary conditions for economic growth following the Depression Era.
However, since the 1970s, folkhemmet has been continuously appropriated by far-right actors as a
result of mass immigration from countries unfamiliar with the Scandinavian way of life. So, what
provided Sweden with the necessary conditions for constructing folkhemmet?
Sweden had remained neutral during both world wars and, as a result, the country was in
an excellent position to take part in the reconstruction of war torn Europe. It also benefited from
an increased demand for foreign labor and, as I mentioned earlier, began recruiting labor
migrants from other European countries. Since the country's production facilities remained
relatively unharmed as a result of both world wars and its labor force was now intact, Europe
favored the Swedish industry and its economy ended up flourishing. It is unclear whether
Sweden could have achieved such success without having operated under the assumption that the
construction of the welfare state was a joint endeavour by the national family.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Sweden was not faced with the same sorts
of immigration problems that we see today. For decades, the country had a fairly small
population that was mostly homogeneous. Swedes felt content with their “little welfare state” and
were proud of the fact that they had found a middle way between capitalism and socialism. All of
this started changing in the 1970s when Sweden began accepting refugees from different parts of
the world. However, in the early 1990s, a particular group of refugees began arriving in Sweden
that seemed to be treated differently than those we see today.
In the early 1990s, an armed conflict took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina that resulted
in thousands of refugees fleeing the former Yugoslavia to find asylum in Sweden. In 1992,
Sweden recorded a record number of asylum seekers, a record that would not be broken again
until the 2015 refugee crisis. Over the next two decades, most of these refugees would
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successfully integrate into Swedish society. What explains the success of Bosnian refugees in
Sweden as opposed to, say, Syrian refugees? It turns out that a healthy relationship between
refugees and their new country is crucial to successful integration, argues one author.46 Similar
levels of education between refugees and the native population is also important to achieving
successful integration in the long run.
Today, some observers argue that Sweden faces issues with refugees from countries such
as Syria and Iraq because they are either poorly educated or not educated at all. As a result, it can
be difficult for them to contribute to Swedish society and the Swedish welfare state in the
capacity that many Swedes expect of them. It doesn't help that Sweden seems to change its
integration policies every ten years or so. What might Sweden do moving forward to address this
issue? One solution is to come up with a more timely version of folkhemmet that takes into
account a changing demographic that Swedes did not have to face a hundred years ago.
Back in the days of Per Albin Hansson, Swedes had a shared sense of mutual obligation,
something that many Swedes argue has been lost somewhere along the way. Despite their best
efforts, it is difficult to imagine that any political party will be able to restore folkhemmet to its
glory days. And maybe they do not need to. Times have changed and Sweden looks very
different than it did in the early twentieth century. For this reason, if Sweden wants to fix some of
the country’s biggest problems, then they should establish a new and improved folkhemmet that is
acceptable by all parties.
As I already mentioned, Sweden was in a great position in the beginning of the twentieth
century to participate in the reconstruction of war torn Europe while making improvements at
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home. The introduction of folkhemmet alleviated class disputes and improved living conditions
for the average Swedish citizen. Sweden quickly became one of the most equal countries in the
world. But while the economy continued to grow for much of the twentieth century, inequality
increased more so than in most other countries surveyed.47 However, since then, Sweden’s
economy has fared better than it did during the late twentieth century.
Historians like Jenny Andersson argue that, following these economic challenges of the
late twentieth century, Sweden once again reemerged as one of the most modern countries in the
world.48 This is the Sweden that we know today, a massively successful country that can get back
on its feet through pragmatic problem solving. However, Sweden still struggles to define itself
when it comes to the politics of memory which politicians like Jimmie Åkesson invoke to bring
Swedes back to an imagined past that largely didn't happen. In one of his speeches that I
introduced earlier in this thesis, Åkesson referred to an imagined past where he felt secure
because Sweden was more or less culturally homogeneous when he was younger. As a result, he
is recreating folkhemmet along cultural lines, something that Per Albin Hansson never really had
to address because back then Sweden was more or less culturally homogeneous.
Per Albin Hansson failed to take into account that as Sweden moved forward in the
twentieth century, opposing ideological actors might latch onto the idea of folkhemmet and
misuse it altogether. While this might seem like the natural transgression of things today, back in
the 1930s it would have been harder to tell what direction Sweden would head in seeing as the
welfare state was still young and it hadn't had the time to develop yet. What might Hansson say
about today's folkhemmet?
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In his speech, Per Albin Hansson called for equality, democracy, and the dissolution of
class differences. While folkhemmet today shares some of these characteristics, it was never quite
clear who it belonged to apart from just “Swedish people.” As we have seen, the Sweden
Democrats took the Swedish people to mean native Swedes, not those who come from other
countries. It is likely that Hansson never meant for this to happen, but because Sweden was more
or less culturally homogeneous at the time, this would not have been an issue. If we think back to
Vilhelm Moberg’s essay, published around the same time as the inception of folkhemmet, he
argues that it was “dead and living Swedes [...] and no one else”49 who made Sweden. Like
Hansson, Moberg does not directly allude to native Swedes but rather uses the term more
vaguely. It is this failure to capture a particular type of Swede early on in the history of
folkhemmet that led to it becoming something that is easily appropriable.
Considering that folkhemmet is such an important part of Swedish history, it is hard to
believe that it has such loosely defined borders. While it is used interchangeably with the
Swedish welfare state, the actual message of folkhemmet was lost somewhere along the way. It
makes perfect sense that a populist political party like the Sweden Democrats would contest its
permeable boundaries at a time when Swedish citizenship and integration laws were changing so
often. After all, whenever a country changes what it means to be a citizen, it opens itself up to
populist contestation. Perhaps no other country is more vulnerable to populist challenge than
Sweden when you consider that folkhemmet is so deeply ingrained in the Swedish welfare state.
Back in the days of Per Albin Hansson, it might have been harder for far-right
movements to garner support because everyone was more or less homogeneous and had a
common idea of what folkhemmet meant. Today, this is not the case and Swedes need to decide
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whether they want to keep an arguably outdated concept. A successful modern folkhemmet
requires rigid boundaries at both the physical and conceptual levels. While I agree with most
historians that Hansson’s speech back in 1928 was phenomenal, he left much of the concept open
to interpretation. Who are the Swedish people he was speaking about? As this thesis suggests,
Hansson wanted it to include everybody but “everybody” in the early twentieth century did not
imply immigrants who share a different culture and set of values.
As I have illustrated, there is not really such a thing as “Swedish culture.” While this is,
of course, debatable, Swedish culture is not easily identifiable in the way that, say, Syrian culture
is. This is precisely why the Sweden Democrats are reluctant to accept refugees from these parts
of the world where they have a completely different set of values and customs. It is also why I
suggest that the modern folkhemmet should embrace more immigrants from these parts of the
world because they might be able to enrich Swedish culture, or lack thereof.
Swedish culture is largely a construct that arose during the early twentieth century in
response to Sweden's reputation as a backwards country that was impoverished and in need of
new ideas. Sweden turned to other countries for inspiration, and under the pragmatic leadership
of figures such as Hjalmar Branting and Per Albin Hansson, the Social Democrats were able to
lift the country out of poverty. They did this under the assumption that it was a joint endeavour
by the national family which they termed folkhemmet. Through a combination of pragmatism and
Sweden's culture of folkhemmet, the country has been massively successful since the
mid-twentieth century. What this means is that the successful modern folkhemmet should take
into account the values that made it successful in the first place. However, rather than vilifying
immigrants, the Sweden Democrats might want to work with the more moderate parties to enact
policies targeted at effective integration. Such a model would preserve the things that the Sweden
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Democrats like about Sweden's welfare state while recognizing that Sweden, and Scandinavia in
general, has its own way of doing things that is no better or worse than any other country.
The key to a successful folkhemmet is recognizing that no one culture is superior to the
other. This is something that critics of the 1975 Immigrant and Minority Policy pointed out by
suggesting that well intentioned policies such as these promote an essentialist viewpoint of
culture that regards Nordic culture as superior to others. Equality was one of the main pillars of
the Swedish welfare state at its inception. Along the way, the Sweden Democrats changed the
nature of the welfare state by suggesting that certain cultures are incompatible with Nordic
values. Ironically, this thesis has found that most Nordic countries view egalitarianism and
mutual respect as central to Swedish values.

Looking Ahead

Throughout history, there have been examples of events that have affected the psyche of a
country's people. The 2015 refugee crisis left a deep mark on Swedish society and its effects have
been felt by almost every Swedish citizen. It was an event that led to what many observers call
the end of Swedish exceptionalism in which Sweden was no longer viewed as the humanitarian
superpower it once was. During this time, reactionary politics became popular and the Sweden
Democrats saw considerable gains in the ensuing elections.
The first thing that Swedes need to come to terms with is the fact that the Sweden
Democrats are here to stay. The party can no longer be ignored by the other parties and, at the
time of writing, the Sweden Democrats have been successful in recent months at becoming more
mainstream. As in any good home, the other parties must either learn to live with the Sweden
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Democrats or convince them that immigration is not such a bad thing after all. So far, they have
only been marginally successful in accomplishing this.
Although far-right populist movements have proliferated across Europe in recent years,
Sweden is somewhat of an anomaly. Unlike far-right parties in countries such as Germany and
Greece, the Sweden Democrats had been largely ostracized by the establishment parties until
fairly recently. Even in neighboring countries like Denmark and Norway, the far-right has formed
coalitions with the more mainstream parties. In Denmark, for example, the Danish People’s Party
has worked alongside the mainstream parties since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In
Sweden, they have been mostly unsuccessful at forming a majority government because none of
the establishment parties really want to govern with the help of the far-right. If the Sweden
Democrats were to make big gains in the next election and form a coalition government with one
of Sweden's establishment parties, it would bring the country more in line with its Scandinavian
neighbors whose far-right parties are already mainstream.
The next election takes place in September 2022 and it is certain to be an interesting one.
At the time of writing, the Sweden Democrats have been able to convince at least three other
parties to accept help from them if they want any chance of defeating Stefan Löfven in next
year’s election.50 If support from opposition parties increases before the next election, the
Sweden Democrats might be able to secure real influence moving forward for the first time since
entering the Riksdag in 2010. The Sweden Democrats have publicly stated that they are happy to
at least be acknowledged in the Riksdag while recognizing that there is still more to be done.51
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A number of scholars have questioned whether it has become the norm for establishment
parties to work with the far-right in Sweden.52 It is clear that some of the establishment parties
are willing to work with the Sweden Democrats on certain issues which has led to further
normalization of the party in recent years. There is concern among the Sweden Democrats that if
they try too hard at making the other parties conform to their politics, the relationship between
both sides will collapse completely, leaving them ostracized once again. Because of this, the
Sweden Democrats need to be very careful in how they interact with the establishment parties or
else they risk losing credibility among Swedish voters. But if they fail to convey their message
hard enough, they risk losing supporters altogether.
The upcoming election will be a formative moment in Swedish politics and whatever
happens next year will shape Sweden in the years to come. Support for the Sweden Democrats is
likely to grow because they have been successful in fashioning the narrative that they are the
only political party defending folkhemmet from “dangerous” immigrants. In one of his speeches,
Jimmie Åkesson goes so far as to claim that if Per Albin Hansson were alive today he would be a
member of the Sweden Democrats.53 But if this thesis has shown anything, it is that the Sweden
Democrats have a very different vision for Sweden's future that contrasts dramatically with the
one envisioned by Per Albin Hansson and the Social Democrats.
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Conclusion

The works of writers such as Vilhelm Moberg remind us that Sweden is an excellent
country. It is a country that was founded on the basis of freedom, equality, and democracy. But
similar to Per Albin Hansson’s speeches, we need to accept the fact that times have changed and
Sweden is no longer the same country it was one hundred years ago. Moreover, intellectuals like
Moberg failed to take into account that one day Sweden might actually become a successful
social democracy capable of accepting a certain number of people from other countries. While
we cannot blame Hansson and Moberg for what they thought in the twentieth century, we can use
this as a lesson that nations needed coherent boundaries, or else they leave themselves open to
populist challenges that threaten the very nature of democracy altogether. For this reason, I have
proposed the creation of a new folkhemmet that takes into account changing demographics as
well as national pride when it comes to the Swedes’ ability to have created such an incredible
welfare state centered around the idea of a people's home.
Swedes can use their conception of Swedish exceptionalism to promote what some would
consider Nordic values without imposing their beliefs on others. A modern people's home is one
of egalitarian values, similar to what we see in some parts of Sweden today, but without the
resentment towards one's fellow citizens. Swedes are all living under the same roof and therefore
should make the best of it whether it was their choice or not. Again, this is ironically iliberal, but
it does take into account the realities of a changing demographic. This changing demographic
does not necessarily need to put an end to Swedish exceptionalism. Rather, it is a signal that now
is the time to put one's differences aside and contribute to the welfare state together. In doing so,
Swedes maintain their culture of folkhemmet while not hurting those who are disadvantaged.
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While this might sound overly idealistic, I believe that most Swedes have it in them to realize this
new model of the people's home.
If this thesis has demonstrated anything it is that the Sweden Democrats are not an
aberration from, but rather a symptom of, the Swedish welfare state and folkhemmet more
specifically. When you think about it, it is actually quite astonishing that the Sweden Democrats
did not emerge sooner considering how Sweden's Nordic neighbours had already seen the
far-right make gains for quite some time. In this sense, Sweden is quite exceptional and stands
out from the rest of Scandinavia. Perhaps there is some new brand of Swedish exceptionalism
that no one really saw coming, or maybe they did see it coming, but simply disavowed it because
it does not fit into the narrative most people have of Sweden. When we think of Sweden we tend
to think of egalitarian values, not far-right ideologies. But this is what has changed in Sweden in
recent years. Sweden can no longer be defined solely by this image that the world has created for
it. The good news is that Swedes are an innovative bunch and more than willing, for the most
part, to compromise on certain issues and come up with a new identity that combines the best of
both worlds.
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